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Abstract
Many fine-grained (if not bigger picture) decisions concerning climate change involve significant, even
severe, uncertainty. Here, we focus on modelling the decisions of single agents, whether individual
persons or groups perceived as corporate entities. We offer a taxonomy of the sources and kinds of
uncertainty that arise in framing these decision problems, as well as strategies for making a choice in spite
of uncertainty. The aim is to facilitate a more transparent and structured treatment of uncertainty in
climate decision making.1. Introduction
The decisions that we make in response to climate change have consequences affecting both
individuals and groups at different places and times. Indeed, they may even affect what groups
or populations exist. Moreover, the circumstances of many of these decisions involve
uncertainty and disagreement that is sometimes both severe and wide-ranging, concerning
not only the state of the climate and the broader social consequences of any action or inaction
on our part, but also the range of actions available to us and what significance we should attach
to their possible consequences.
These considerations make climate decision-making both important and hard. The stakes are
high, and so too are the difficulties for standard decision theory – plenty of reason for philosoph-
ical engagement with this particular application of decision theory. It is unlikely though that
there will be a single, simple recipe for handling climate decisions. For one thing, different agents
face very different kinds of decisions and do so from quite different perspectives; the problems
faced by individual citizens are different from those of national governments or international
organisations. Furthermore, many hold that an inherent feature of severe uncertainty and dis-
agreement in a decision problem is that oftentimes we must appeal to principles beyond ratio-
nality in order to determine a unique solution, i.e. in order to settle on a final choice of action.
In the first section, we look more carefully at the main actors in the climate domain and the
kinds of decision problems that concern them. In the second, we examine the multidimensional
nature of the uncertainty that provides the context in which these decisions are made. In the
third, we explain why this context confounds standard decision theory and consider plausible
responses to this challenge, given that decisions must inevitably be made.2. Agents And Climate Decision Problems
When introducing decision theory, it is common to distinguish three main domains: individual
decision theory (which concerns the decision problem of a single agent who may be uncertain
of her environment), game theory (which focuses on cases of strategic interaction amongst
rational agents) and social choice theory (which concerns procedures by which a number of agents© 2015 The Authors.
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800 Climate Policy and Decision-Makingmay ‘think’ and act collectively).1 All three realms are relevant to the climate change predicament,
whether the concern is adapting to climate change or mitigating climate change or both.
Determining the appropriate agential perspective and type of engagement between agents is
important, because otherwise, decision-modelling efforts may be in vain. For instance, it may
be futile to focus on the plight of individual citizens when the power to affect change really lies
with states. It may likewise be misguided to analyse the prospects for a collective action on climate
policy if the supposed members of the group do not see themselves as contributing to a shared
decision that is good for the group as a whole. It would also be misleading to exclude from an
individual agent’s decision model the impact of others who perceive that they are acting in a stra-
tegic environment. This is not, however, to recommend a narrow view of the role of decision
models – that they must always realistically represent the key decisions at hand; the point is rather
that we should not employ decision models with particular agential framings in a naïve way.
The general purpose of decision modelling could be to provide an argument, or an
exploration of the reasons, for taking particular courses of action. This could be a very direct
argument – the model might attempt to capture a decision problem that a particular agent
(whether an individual or group) actually faces, where the idea is to identify the rational/fair
course of action, by the agent’s current lights. In this case, it is important to determine, as well
as possible, the agent’s current preferences, together with the preferences of any other agents
that will impact on decision outcomes. For instance, consider the designing of a proposed
emissions trading scheme: to be credible, the consequences of various design options, such as
the allocation of carbon allowances, must account for the actual motivations and choice
behaviour of various industry players, and the final evaluation of options must account for actual
policy concerns (not least the goal for overall emissions reduction).2
Alternatively, the argument presented by a decision model might be more indirect – the
model might present a decision scenario that serves as a contrast or a reference point that enables
better comprehension of the actual decision setting, and the potential for change. Such a model
would identify the rational/fair course of action conditional on certain features that are not
necessarily true of the world, perhaps to do with the agents’ preferences or the extent of group
cooperation. Global economic analyses of climate change such as the Stern Review or the
scenarios presented in the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change
(IPCC) may be viewed in this light. The Stern Review (2007), for instance, takes the
perspective of a global social planner; to this end, the costs of substantial mitigation of climate
change are compared with ‘business as usual’ emissions, where costs are calculated in terms of
a time-discounted utilitarian aggregate of individual wellbeing over a time horizon of several
centuries.3 More recently, game theorists have offered alternative state-centred benchmarks
for mitigation – models that focus on strategic interaction amongst groups of states, given
assumptions about the ‘national interest’ of these respective states.4
Getting the agential perspective right is just the first step in framing a decision problem so that
it presents convincing reasons for action. There remains the task of representing the details of the
decision problem from the appropriate epistemic and evaluative perspective.We turn to this task
now.Our focus is individual decision theory, for reasons of space, and because most decision set-
tings ultimately involve the decision of an individual, whether this be a single person or a group.3. Uncertainty And Disagreement
The standard model of (individual) decision-making under uncertainty used by decision
theorists derives from the classic work of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and Leonard
Savage (1954). It treats actions as functions from possible states of the world to consequences,
these being the complete outcomes of performing the action in question in that state of the© 2015 The Authors.
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with rows representing actions (hereA1 andA2), columns representing states of the world (here
S1, S2 and S3) and table entries representing the consequences associated with each action and
state pair (here O1,1, …, O2,3). All uncertainty is taken to be uncertainty about the state of
the world and is quantified by a single probability function over the possible states, where the
probabilities in question measure either objective risk or the decision maker’s degrees of belief
(or a combination of the two). The relative value of consequences is represented by an interval-
scaled utility function over these consequences. Decision makers are advised to choose the
action with maximum expected utility (EU), where the EU for an action is the sum of the
probability-weighted utility of the possible consequences of the action.5
It is our contention that this model is inadequate for many climate-oriented decisions,
because it fails to properly represent the multidimensional nature and severity of the uncertainty
that decision makers face. To begin with, not all the uncertainty that climate decision makers
face is empirical uncertainty about the actual state of the world (state uncertainty). There may
be further empirical uncertainty about what options are available to them and what are the con-
sequences of exercising each option for each respective state (option uncertainty). Furthermore,
decision makers face a non-empirical kind of uncertainty – ethical uncertainty – about what
values to assign to possible consequences.6 Before elaborating on these different facets of uncer-
tainty, however, let us brief ly comment on the general sources of uncertainty.
One source of uncertainty in climate decision models is simply our epistemic limitations,
ultimately the limitations of our current best science. There are (potentially irresolvable)
scientific limitations to projections of future climate under the various conceivable emissions
scenarios. This is compounded by broader scientific, and especially social scientific, uncertainty
about the effects of climate changes on the constituents of human wellbeing, such as food
production and health, which may be even more severe in virtue of depending on estimates
of human responses to climate change. In general, the more detailed the information the
decision maker seeks, in spatial, temporal or other empirical terms, the greater the scientific
uncertainty. The upshot is that science cannot deliver the precise probabilistic predictions that
are required for many applications of standard decision theory.
The other source of uncertainty in climate decision-making is expert disagreement. One
might think that there is inevitably disagreement where there is scientific uncertainty, but the
two do not amount to the same thing: indeed, there may be more or less disagreement amongst
scientists about the nature and extent of scientific uncertainty about a particular empirical claim.
Beyond that, there is of course scope for reasonable disagreement amongst experts on non-
empirical issues, in particular the relative goodness of possible decision consequences. Disagree-
ment of this sort manifests in social debate about the aims of climate policy interventions or the
standards by which they should be judged.7 While different in character, disagreement has a
similar upshot for decision modelling as scientific uncertainty: it fails to deliver a precise
representation of the decision problem as required by standard decision theory.Fig. 1. Abstract decision problem in tabular form.
© 2015 The Authors.
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As noted above, standard decision theory holds that all empirical uncertainty can be represented
by a probability function over the possible states of the world. There are two issues here: (i)
confining all empirical uncertainty to the state space is rather unnatural for complex decision
problems such as those associated with climate change, and (ii) using a precise probability
function to represent uncertainty about states (and consequences) can misrepresent the severity
of this uncertainty, whether it stems from scientific limitations or disagreement or both.
On the first point, the idea is that decision models are less convoluted if we allow the
uncertainty about states to depend on the actions that might be taken,8 and if we also permit
further uncertainty about what consequence will arise under each state, given the action taken.
For instance, consider a crude version of the mitigation decision problem faced by the global
planner: it may be useful to depict the decision problem with a state-space partition in terms
of possible increases in average global temperature (AGT) over a given time period, as per Fig. 2.
In this case, our beliefs about the states (how likely they each are) would be conditional on the
mitigation option taken. Moreover, for each respective mitigation option, the consequence aris-
ing in each of the states plausibly depends on further uncertain features of the world; for instance,
the extent to which, on average, regional conditions would be favourable to food production
and whether social institutions would facilitate resilience in food production. (In Fig. 2 below,
the probability distribution over food production outcomes indicated by the random variable
X plausibly differs for each consequence entry in the table, i.e. for each act–state combination.)
Besides permitting more elegant decision models, the distinction between state uncertainty and
option uncertainty with respect to consequences may be useful for tracking at least some of the
compounding uncertainty associated with predictions of climate change impacts. In general, it is
useful to structure uncertainty about climate change impacts in terms of a hierarchy, where the
severity of uncertainty increases as we go downwards (cf. Heal and Millner 2014): the less ‘basic’
the issue, in terms of scientific priority, and/or the more ‘refined’ the prediction required, in
spatial/temporal terms, the further down we are in the uncertainty hierarchy, i.e. the more severe
the uncertainty. Thus, towards the top, we have coarse global average estimates of basic climate
variables like temperature or precipitation. Further down the hierarchy, we have finer regional
estimates of these climate variables as well as other less basic climate and ecological variables, until
ultimately we reach estimates of detailed socioeconomic variables. One modelling proposal is that
the state space covers possibilities in the top half of the hierarchy while the consequence space
includes possibilities in the bottom half of the hierarchy. The uncertainty at these two loci might
even be ‘managed’ differently in non-standard decision theories.9 An important question in this
regard is whether there is, or need be, a principled way of making this state-space/conse-
quence-space division.Fig. 2. Mitigation decision model where state likelihoods depend on acts, and moreover, there is not a determinate
consequence associated with each act-state pair.
© 2015 The Authors.
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expressed in terms of precise probabilities over states and/or consequences. With regard to
the model in Fig. 2, for instance, the position of the scientific community may be reasonably
well represented by a precise probability distribution over the state space, conditional on the
mitigation option, but precise probabilities over the possible food productions, given this option
and average global temperature rise, are less plausible. Popular amongst philosophers is the use of
sets of probability functions. This is a minimal generalisation of the standard decision model, in
the sense that probability measures still feature, roughly, the more severe the uncertainty, the
more probability measures over the space of possibilities needed to conjointly represent the
epistemic situation.10 See Halpern (2003) for a thorough treatment of frameworks, both
qualitative and quantitative, for representing uncertainty.
There is arguably a further aspect to option uncertainty that is overlooked in standard
decision theory: uncertainty about what acts/options are actually available to the decision
maker. Indeed, one of the greatest difficulties facing climate decision makers is how to form
expectations about technological developments that might assist in mitigating the effects of
climate change or in adapting to it. The IPCC (2014a) ARC-5 WGIII report, for instance,
acknowledges that mitigation costs are greatly dependent on future technological options, in
particular, options for enhanced energy efficiency and reduced carbon intensity of energy
production. Of course, one might contest that any such option uncertainty merely indicates a
f lawed decision model; for example, apparent uncertainty about whether the option ‘mandate
solar-powered cars’ is feasible simply reveals that the actual available option is rather ‘support
research on affordable solar cars’. But why should all empirical uncertainty in a decision model,
particularly where this uncertainty is severe, be relegated to the state space, rather than also be
distributed over the act space as well as the consequence space associated with each act–state
pair? Of course, the question remains as to whether there is, or need be, a principled way to sort
uncertainties in this manner.3.2. ETHICAL UNCERTAINTY
Decision makers face uncertainty not only about what will or could happen but also about
what value to attach to these possibilities. Such value or ethical uncertainty can have a
number of different sources. Some of it may be essentially empirical, such as when we don’t
know what value to attach to a car because we are unsure as to how safe it is or what speeds it
can obtain. Another source, also ultimately empirical in nature, is uncertainty about
preferences, either our own ( future) ones or those of others affected by our decisions. This
is a common problem in decisions with broad spatial and temporal ramifications (consider
buying a present for someone’s birthday several years in advance). Finally, there is non-
empirical or pure ethical uncertainty that arises when trying to value completely specified
objects or outcomes. One might, for instance, have complete information about the
attributes of the car one is evaluating but be unsure what weight to put on these attributes,
how to trade off safety and speed for example.
Ethical uncertainty, including the pure kind, arises in many aspects of climate decision-
making; for instance, in judgements about how to distribute the costs and benefits of
mitigation amongst different regions and countries, about how to take account of persons
whose existence depends on what actions are chosen now and about the degree to which
future wellbeing should be discounted. Of these, the latter has been the subject of the most
debate, because of the extent to which (the global planner’s) decisions about how drastically
to cut carbon emissions are sensitive to the discount rate used in evaluating the possible
outcomes of doing so. In Weitzman’s words (2007, 705), ‘In fact it is not an exaggeration© 2015 The Authors.
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about which interest rate to use for discounting.’ Discounting thus provides a good
illustration of the importance of ethical uncertainty.
Many climate decisions have long temporal horizons in that comparing the relevant options
depends on consequences that stretch far into the future. Inevitably, therefore, decision makers
must balance the interests of the current generation against future ones. In economic models,
this is ref lected in a discount rate applied to a measure of total wellbeing at different points in
time (the ‘pure rate of time preference’), with a positive rate implying that future wellbeing
carries less weight in the evaluations of options than present wellbeing.11 Many philosophers
regard any pure discounting of future wellbeing as completely unjustified from an objective
point of view. This is not to deny that temporal locationmay nonetheless correlate with features
of the distribution of wellbeing that are in fact ethically significant. If people will be better off in
the future, for instance, it is reasonable to be less concerned about their interests than those of the
present generation, much as one might prioritise the less well off within a single generation. But
the mere fact of a benefit occurring at a particular time cannot be relevant to its value, at least
from an impartial perspective.
Economists do nonetheless often discount wellbeing in their policy-oriented models,
although they disagree considerably about what pure rate of time preference should be used.
One view, exemplified by the Stern Review and representing the impartial perspective
described above, is that only a very small rate (in the order of 0.5%) is justified, and this on
the grounds of the small probability of the extinction of the human population. Other
economists, however, regard a partial rather than an impartial point of view more appropriate
in their models. A view along these lines, exemplified by Nordhaus (2007) and Arrow
(1995a), is that the pure rate of time preference should be determined by the preferences of
current people.12 The current generation does of course care about future generations, as
is evident in the fact of its willingness to support infrastructural expenditure with long-time
horizons and in individual bequests to the next generation. But typical derivations of aver-
age pure time discounting from observed market behaviour are much higher than those
used by Stern (around 3% by Nordhaus’s estimate). Although the use of this data has been
criticised for providing an inadequate measure of people’s reasoned preferences, the point
remains that any plausible method for determining the current generation’s attitude to
the wellbeing of future generations is likely to yield a rate higher than that advocated by
the Stern Review. To the extent that this debate about the ethical basis for discounting
remains unresolved, there will be ethical uncertainty about the discount rate in climate
policy decisions.4. Managing Uncertainty
How should a decision maker choose amongst the courses of action available to her when she
must make the choice under conditions of severe uncertainty? The problem that climate
decision makers face is that, in these situations, the precise utility and probability values required
by standard EU theory may not be readily available.
There are, broadly speaking, three possible responses to this problem. Firstly, the decision
maker can simply bite the bullet and try to settle on precise probability and utility judgements
for the relevant contingencies, doing the best that she can under the circumstances. Secondly,
the decisionmaker can try to delaymaking a decision, or at least postpone parts of it, in the hope
that her uncertainty will become manageable as more information becomes available, or as
disagreements resolve themselves through a change in attitudes. Finally, the decision maker
can make use of a different decision rule to that prescribed by EU theory, one that is much less© 2015 The Authors.
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much recent work in decision theory.4.1. REACHING A JUDGEMENT
Orthodox decision theorists argue that rationality requires that decisions be made as if they
maximise the decision maker’s subjective expectation of benefit relative to her precise degrees
of belief and values. So precise doxastic and evaluative judgements (whether explicit or not) are
mandatory, on pain of irrationality, irrespective of the circumstances in which the decision is
made. Broome gives an unf linching defence of this approach:
The lack of ﬁrm probabilities is not a reason to give up expected value theory. You might despair
and adopt some other way of coping with uncertainty … That would be a mistake. Stick with
expected value theory, since it is very well founded, and do your best with probabilities and values.
(2012, 129)
We will canvas an opposing view below in Section 4.3. But in any case, there remains the ques-
tion of how to follow Broome’s advice: how should the decision maker settle, in a non-arbitrary
way, on a precise opinion on decision-relevant issues in the face of an effectively ‘divided mind’?
There are two interrelated strategies: she can deliberate further and/or aggregate conf licting
views. The former aims for convergence in opinion, while the latter aims for an acceptable
compromise in the face of persisting conf lict.
Deliberation is generally thought to involve iterative exchange, examination and weighing of
reasons, and consequent revision of opinion. There is some debate amongst scientists as to
whether deliberation in various contexts really does improve the quality of opinions, much less
lead to agreement.13 In any case, when deliberation fails to result in consensus, we must appeal
to some method for aggregating different viewpoints. Two basic approaches to aggregation are
particularly salient: voting rules choose the ‘best’ opinions from amongst the available ones,
while averaging rules (such as ‘splitting the difference’ and linear averaging) form aggregate
opinions that are compromises between the individual ones. In the latter case, there is a question
of what weight to accord each individual viewpoint. When there is no reason for favouring one
opinion over the others, the principle of insufficient reason dictates treating each equally. But
the literature recognises a great variety of contexts in which considerations favour discriminatory
treatment of the various viewpoints.144.2. POSTPONING THE DECISION
The second possible response that is available to decision makers, at least in some contexts, is to
delay all or part of the decision until more information is available or some of the disagreement is
resolved. Not surprisingly, this response is rather popular amongst politicians who would rather
not be held responsible for decisions that impose costs on their constituencies. For the same
reason, it is held in low regard by those most concerned about the effects of climate change.
Some distance from the political heat is therefore required in order to consider the advantages
and disadvantages of delaying decisions.
The basic motive for delaying a decision is to maintain f lexibility at zero cost (see Koopmans
1962, Kreps and Porteus 1978, Arrow 1995b). Suppose that wemust decide between building a
cheap but low sea wall or a high, but expensive, one, and that the relative desirability of these
two courses of action depends on unknown factors, such as the extent to which sea levels will
rise. In this case, it would be sensible to consider building a low wall first but leave open the© 2015 The Authors.
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best option: at worst, no new information is acquired by the time the low wall is completed and
you are in much the same situation as you started; at best, you are able to make the optimal
choice at the later time. In many adaptation scenarios, the analogue of the ‘low sea wall’ may
in fact be social-institutional measures that enable a delayed response to climate change, what-
ever the details of this change turn out to be. When it comes to long-term water planning, for
instance, it may be optimal to initially strengthen systems of governance for water distribution
and usage in order to accommodate any change in supply, and only later decide on further
measures that depend on predictions about the nature of the change in supply.15 In many cases,
however, the prospect of cost-free postponement of a decision (or part thereof ) is simply a
mirage, since delay often decreases rather than increases opportunities due to changes in the
background environment. This is often true for climate change adaptation decisions, not to
mention mitigation decisions. The extent of the benefit of delaying will depend on
the possibilities for sufficiently limiting these costs by breaking the original decision
problem down into relatively autonomous, subsidiary decision problems that can be settled
sequentially.4.3. ALTERNATIVE DECISION RULES
The third strategy to consider is that of applying an alternative decision rule to that of
maximising expected utility, one that is tailored to situations of severe uncertainty. A great
many different proposals for such rules exist in the literature, involving more or less radical
departures from the orthodox theory and varying in the informational demands they make.
Our focus will be on rules that handle state and ethical uncertainty16; in particular, we focus
on rules that take as inputs the set of all permissible pairs of probability and utility functions
characterising the decision maker’s uncertainty. We regard these rules as candidates for
rational choice, i.e., as challenges to the notion that rational agents must abide by all the
dictates of EU theory.
It should be noted from the outset that there is one widely agreed rationality constraint on
these non-standard decision rules: ‘(EU)-dominated options’ are not admissible choices, i.e., if
an option has lower expected utility than another option according to all permissible pairs of
probability and utility functions, then the former dominated option is not an admissible choice.
This is a relatively minimal constraint, but it may well yield a unique choice of action in some
decision scenarios. In such cases, the severe uncertainty is not in fact decision-relevant. For
example, it may be the case that, from the global planner’s perspective, a given mitigation
option is better than continuing with business as usual, whatever the uncertain details of the
climate system. This is even more plausible to the extent that the mitigation option counts as
a ‘win-win’ strategy (Maskin and Austin 2012), i.e., to the extent that it has other positive
impacts, say, on air quality or energy security, regardless of mitigation results. In many more
fine-grained or otherwise difficult decision contexts, however, the non-EU-dominance
constraint may exclude only a few of the available options as choice-worthy.
A consideration that is often appealed to in order to further discriminate between options is
caution. Indeed, this is an important facet of the popular but ill-defined Precautionary
Principle.17 Cautious decision rules give more weight to the ‘down-side’ risks, the
possible negative implications of a choice of action. The Maxmin-EU rule, for instance,
recommends picking the action with greatest minimum expected utility (see Gilboa and
Schmeidler 1989, Walley 1991). The rule is simple to use, but arguably much too cautious,
paying no attention at all to the full spread of possible expected utilities. The α-Maxmin
rule, in contrast, recommends taking the action with the greatest α-weighted sum of the© 2015 The Authors.
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minimum and maximum expected utilities can be thought of as ref lecting either the decision
maker’s pessimism in the face of uncertainty or else their degree of caution (see Binmore
2009).18
A more informationally demanding set of rules are those that draw on considerations of
confidence and/or reliability. The thought here is that an agent is more or less confident about
the various probability and utility functions that characterise her uncertainty. For instance, when
the estimates derive from different models or experts, the decision maker may regard some
models as better corroborated by available evidence than others or else some experts as more
reliable than others in their judgement. In these cases, it is reasonable, ceteris paribus, to favour
actions of which you are more confident that they will have beneficial consequences. One
(rather sophisticated) way of doing this is to weight each of the expected utilities associated with
an action in accordancewith how confident you are about the judgements supporting them and
then choose the action withmaximum confidence-weighted (transformed) expected utility (see
Klibanoff et al. 2005). This rule is not very different from maximising expected utility, and in-
deed, one could regard confidence weighting as an aggregation technique rather than an alter-
native decision rule. But considerations of confidence may be appealed to even when precise
confidence weights cannot be provided. Gärdenfors and Sahlin (1982), for instance, suggest
simply excluding from consideration any estimates that fall below a reliability threshold and then
picking cautiously from the remainder. Similarly, Hill (2013) uses an ordinal measure of
confidence that allows for stake-sensitive thresholds of reliability that can then be combined
with varying levels of caution.
One might finally distinguish decision rules that are cautious in a slightly different way – that
compare options in terms of ‘robustness’ to uncertainty. Better options are those that are more
assured of having an expected utility that is good enough or regret-free, in the face of
uncertainty.19 Recall that the uncertainty in question may be multi-faceted, concerning
probabilities of states/outcomes, or values of final outcomes. Most decision rules that appeal
to robustness assume that a best estimate for the relevant variables is available (perhaps achieved
by one of the methods described in Section 4.1) and then consider deviations away from this
estimate. A robust option is one that has a satisfactory expected utility relative to a class of
estimates that deviate from the best one to some degree; the wider the class in question, the
more robust the option. Much depends on what expected utility level is deemed
satisfactory, but roughly speaking, in the context of climate change decisions, robust options
are those that yield reasonable outcomes for all the inopportune climate scenarios that have
non-negligible probability given some range of uncertainty. In the case of adaptation, these
are plausibly options that focus on resilience to any and all of the aforesaid climate scenarios,
perhaps via the development of social institutions that can coordinate responses to variability
and change.205. Conclusion
Climate change decisions evidently raise important challenges for the application of standard
expected utility theory. This is in part due to the circumstances of multidimensional, severe
uncertainty and in part due to the public nature of many climate decisions, which comes with
the demand for fully explicable and reason-based choices. Our aim here is not to advocate any
particular position regarding what rationality ultimately requires/permits in these circumstances,
but rather to encourage decision modellers to think broadly about the possibilities for framing
decision problems and justifying the corresponding choices, and to make their analyses as
explicit as possible.© 2015 The Authors.
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in decision-making is a matter of careful scientific and practical reasoning. Uncertainty does not
amount to absence of reason for engaging with a decision problem. Indeed, continuing with the
status quo may well be a highly risky option in the face of uncertainty. We have also seen that
not all decisions are equally threatened by uncertainty. Roughly speaking, the more fine-
grained the decision, in terms of the nature of the competing options and the contingencies that
their comparative evaluations depend upon, the more uncertainty complicates choice, and thus
the more one confronts controversies in decision-making.
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Notes
* Correspondence to: Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientiﬁc Method, London School of Economics and Political
Science. Email: k.steele@lse.ac.uk1 See, for instance, Resnik (1987) for further preliminary discussion of these key domains of rational choice theory.
2 Hepburn et al. (2006) well illustrate this kind of decision analysis – they investigate the auctioning of carbon allowances
within the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) Phase II.
3 See Frisch (2013), however, for a skeptical account of the role that ‘integrated assessment models (IAMs)’, including the
one underpinning the Stern Review, can play in policy making, due to their opacity and false precision.
4 SeeTavoni (2013) for a brief summary of the game theoretic perspective onmitigation, including references to key recentworks.
5 See, for instance, Resnik (1987), for a primer on expected utility theory.
6 See Hansson (1994) for a slightly different typology of uncertainty.
7 Note that scientiﬁc uncertainty and disagreement can compound on each other: for instance, ethical disagreement about
best policy within a community plausibly leads to social scientiﬁc uncertainty about the evolution of relevant policy
instruments and institutions.
8 Cf. Richard Jeffrey’s (1965) expected utility theory.
9 See, for instance, the decision rule proposed by Walker and Dietz (2011), which treats state and option uncertainty differently.
10 For early discussions of so-called imprecise probabilities, see Levi (1974, 1986), Gärdenfors and Sahlin ([1982] 1988), Bewley
(1986/2002) and Walley (1991).
11 Note that the overall ‘social discount rate’ in economic models involves other terms besides the pure rate of time
preference; these other discounting terms apply to goods or consumption rather than wellbeing per se. See Broome
(1992) and Parﬁt (1984) for helpful discussions of the reasons for discounting goods that do not imply discounting
wellbeing.
12 See also Beckerman and Hepburn (2007) for ethical arguments supporting a partial orientation towards the pure rate of
time preference.
13 Fishkin and Luskin (2005) canvas criticisms of deliberation (that it is futile or else harmful) and provide some empirical
evidence to the contrary.© 2015 The Authors.
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Climate Policy and Decision-Making 80914 There are various expositions of the aggregation problem for different types of opinions, whether probabilistic beliefs,
paired probabilities and utilities, overall preferences or more general binary judgments: see, for instance, Genest and Zidek
(1986), Mongin (1995), Sen (1970) and List and Puppe (2009). There is a comparatively small formal literature on
deliberation, a seminal contribution being Lehrer and Wagner’s (1981) model for updating probabilistic beliefs.
15 Wilby and Dessai (2010) discuss resilience and list various such measures for water planning. Here, we draw attention to
those resilience initiatives that are part of a broader adaptation strategy and enable cost-free delay of more risky choices (e.g. to
do with expensive infrastructure projects). In other cases, ‘resilience strategies’ are better understood as compromises or
‘robust’ options in the face of uncertainty (as discussed below in Section 4.3).
16 We leave aside option uncertainty. See Ghirardato (2001) for a treatment of it.
17 The Precautionary Principle is referred to in the latest IPCC (2014b) ARC-5 WGII report. See Steele (2006) and the
recent Steel (2015) for discussion of what the Precautionary Principle stands for.
18 For a comprehensive survey of non-standard decision theories for handling severe uncertainty in the economics literature,
see Gilboa and Marinacci (2002).
19 The ‘information-gap theory’ developed by Ben-Haim (2001) provides one formalisation of this basic idea that has
proved popular in environmental management theory.
20 Robust decision-making is endorsed, for instance, by Dessai et al. (2009) and Wilby and Dessai (2010), who indeed
associate this kind of decision rule with resilience strategies. See also Linkov et al. (2014) for discussion of resilience
strategies vis-à-vis risk management.Works Cited
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